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Abstract
In Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court held that although the bankruptcy courts had statutory
authority to issue final and binding decisions on counterclaims based entirely in state law, the
bankruptcy courts—as non-Article III tribunals—lacked constitutional authority to do so. While
the Court stated that its ruling was narrow, the decision’s reasoning has resulted in a great deal of
uncertainty regarding the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue final decisions on matters that
do not directly stem from the bankruptcy process. Bankruptcy judges across the country are thus
struggling to define the bounds of bankruptcy court authority and jurisdiction. Recognizing this
uncertainty, this article provides a multi-step inquiry to assist bankruptcy judges and
practitioners in deciding whether an issue is capable of being adjudicated in a non-Article III
tribunal post-Stern.
I. Introduction
There is an oft-quoted saying: “May you live in interesting times.”2 Those connected to
bankruptcy practice are thus truly fortunate, for as Robert C. Goodrich and Madison L. Martin
maintain: “[I]nteresting times are guaranteed for bankruptcy practitioners and judges as long as
bankruptcy appeals continue to make their way to the . . . Supreme Court.”3 Of course, given
that the term “interesting” is generally intended, at least in this context, to mean either
“turbulent” or “dangerous,” the above was written mostly tongue-in-cheek.4
But admitting such flippancy is not intended to detract from the poignant observations of
Goodrich and Martin. In fact, the recent Supreme Court decision Stern v. Marshall illustrates
well the notion that “interesting times” are guaranteed for those connected to bankruptcy
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practice, so long as bankruptcy cases continue to make their way to the Supreme Court.5 In
brief, the Stern Court held that “Bankruptcy Court[s] . . . lack[] the constitutional authority to
enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on
a creditor’s proof of claim.”6 And although the Court stated that its ruling was “narrow” and
limited to “one isolated respect,”7 the decision’s logic has “prompted a wave of challenges to the
authority of bankruptcy courts to issue final decisions on matters that do not directly stem from
the bankruptcy process.”8 As one bankruptcy judge lamented:
[B]ombshell does fairly describe Stern’s impact [on the bankruptcy system] . . .
Everyday I am presented with . . . orders that Congress expects me to either sign
as final or forward on with a report and recommendation. . . . [P]rior to Stern, I
[had] a standard—28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)—to serve as my guide. But now I am
told that that standard is unreliable when tested against the Constitution itself. My
frustration with Stern is that it offers virtually no insight as to how to recalibrate
the core/non-core dichotomy so that I can . . . proceed with at least some
assurance that I will not be making the same constitutional blunder with respect to
some other aspect of Authority Section 157(b)(2).9
Some commenters and bankruptcy judges agree with this characterization of Stern, claiming that
the decision signals a “serious threat” to the current bankruptcy system.10 Other commenters and
judges disagree, claiming instead that the opinion “is replete with language . . . that the ruling
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should be limited to the unique circumstances of that case.”11 Whatever the intended import of
Stern, the decision has engendered a great deal of uncertainty as to the constitutionally
permissible bounds of bankruptcy court jurisdiction. For instance, some courts have held that
Stern limits the ability of bankruptcy tribunals to enter final judgments on fraudulent transfer
claims.12 Others disagree.13 Courts have similarly split on whether parties are capable of
consenting to bankruptcy court jurisdiction.14 Recognizing this uncertainty, this article provides
a multi-step inquiry that is intended to assist judges and practitioners in determining whether a
matter is still capable of being adjudicated in a non-Article III tribunal post-Stern.
II. History of the Bankruptcy System in the United States
Before examining Stern v. Marshall and its potential impact on the American bankruptcy
system, a review of that system—from its historical roots to present-day—is needed.

For

without first understanding the development of the American bankruptcy system and the preStern state of affairs, it would be impossible to fully comprehend and appreciate the potential
implications of Stern on the current bankruptcy system.
1. American Bankruptcy Law Prior to 1978 Amendments
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“The Bankruptcy Clause, empowering Congress to ‘pass uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies,’ was added late in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention [of 1787],
after very little debate.”15 As explained by James Madison: “The power of establishing uniform
laws of bankruptcy [was] so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce . . . that the
expediency of [the clause] seem[ed] not likely to be drawn into question.”16 Although plenary in
its power,17 Congress did not enact “permanent federal bankruptcy legislation” until more than a
century after the Convention.18 Consequently, from 1789–1898, bankruptcy law was largely the
province of state regulation.19
But all that changed with the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which marked the
beginning of an era of pervasive federal bankruptcy legislation.20

The Act was primarily

directed at “facilitating the . . . efficient administration and distribution of the debtor’s property
to creditors,”21 and few provisions of the Act were directed at providing relief to the debtor.22
Under the 1898 Act, the federal district courts presided over matters of bankruptcy, but most of
the judicial and administrative matters were handled by non-Article III adjuncts—individuals
termed “bankruptcy referees”—appointed by the federal district courts.23

Interestingly,

enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 appears to have ignited “[c]ongressional infatuation
with bankruptcy law,” and the twentieth century consequently witnessed an “unending parade of
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bankruptcy legislation.”24 In brief, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 remained in effect for eighty
years and was amended multiple times.25
2. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the first comprehensive overhaul of the 1898
Act.26 The reform process lasted just under a decade.27 The process began in 1968 with Senator
Burdick presiding over hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee to
ascertain whether a bankruptcy review commission should be created, and the hearings
ultimately resulted in the formation of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States.28

Congress charged the commission with studying, analyzing, evaluating, and

recommending changes to the 1898 Act so that, once implemented, the reformed Act would be
better able to “meet the demands of present technical, financial, and commercial activities [in the
United States].”29 After nearly a decade of study and debate, President Jimmy Carter signed the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 into law.30
One major weakness of the 1898 Act was its “splintered jurisdictional scheme.”31 Under
the 1898 Act, the bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction over only “certain core matters,”32 while the
state courts retained concurrent jurisdiction over many “bankruptcy-related issues.”33

As

explained by Professor Charles Tabb: “[l]itigation over which court had jurisdiction was frequent

24

Tabb, supra note 15, at 26.
Id. at 23. A detailed examination of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its amendments is beyond the scope of
this article. For a detailed discussion of the 1898 Act and its amendments, see id. at 23–33.
26
Id. at 32.
27
See id. at 32–34 (detailing passage of the 1978 Act).
28
Id. at 32.
29
Id. at 33.
30
Tabb, supra note 15, at 34.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 25.
25

Talicska 5

[in those days].”34 Thus, a major feature of the 1978 Act was the “substantial enlargement of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction . . . enabling bankruptcy judges to hear virtually any matter arising
in, or related to the bankruptcy case.”35

However, the 1978 Act retained the bankruptcy

referees—renamed bankruptcy judges in 1973—as non-Article III adjuncts to the federal district
courts.36
While it was widely agreed that the decision to expand the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts in the 1978 Act was a “substantial improvement” over the 1898 Act,37 that choice—when
coupled with the decision to retain the bankruptcy judges as non-Article III adjuncts to the
federal district courts—later “proved improvident” when the Supreme Court found that the Act
of 1978 impermissibly conferred “broad adjudicatory powers” on non-Article III tribunals in
violation of the United States Constitution.38
3. The Northern Pipeline Decision
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,39 the Supreme Court
found that the broad grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts in the 1978 Act violated Article III
of the United States Constitution by:
[I]mpermissibly remov[ing] most, if not all, of the essential attributes of the judicial
power from the Art[icle] III district court[s], and . . . vest[ing] those attributes in a nonArt[icle] III adjunct. . . . [This] grant of jurisdiction . . . cannot be sustained as an exercise
of Congress’ power to create adjuncts to Article III courts.40
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The Supreme Court “further held that the unconstitutional portion of the jurisdictional grant
could not be severed from the constitutional portion.”41 The Court accordingly condemned the
entire bankruptcy system, thereby forcing Congress to reorganize the jurisdictional scheme.42
Congress responded—several years later—with the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (“BAFJA”).43
To remedy the constitutional concerns raised by the Supreme Court in its Northern
Pipeline decision, the jurisdictional scheme established by Congress in the BAFJA authorized
bankruptcy judges to “hear and determine” all cases arising under Title 11 and “all core
proceedings” related thereto,44 but prohibited bankruptcy judges from determining non-core
proceedings.45 Rather, the BAFJA commands that bankruptcy judges, when presiding over noncore proceedings, are to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the federal
district courts and, after considering those proposed findings and reviewing de novo those
matters to which parties have timely and specifically objected, the district judge is to enter a final
order of judgment.46 The BAFJA thus established a bifurcated jurisdictional scheme.47 This
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bifurcated scheme was believed to remedy the constitutional concerns raised by the Court in
Northern Pipeline—at least until the recent Supreme Court opinion of Stern v. Marshall.48
4. The Stern v. Marshall Decision
Stern v. Marshall “involved a creditor, Pierce Marshall, who filed a ‘proof of claim’ in
the bankruptcy case of Vickie Lynn Marshall—otherwise known as Anna Nicole Smith—arising
out of her allegedly defamatory remarks regarding Pierce.”49

Vickie Lynn “then filed a

counterclaim against Pierce for his alleged tortious interference with her expectancy of a gift”
from her late-husband, and Pierce Marshall’s father, J. Howard Marshall II.50 In brief, Vickie
Lynn alleged that Pierce had “fraudulently induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that did not
include her, even though J. Howard meant to give her half his property.”51 Of course, given the
bifurcated jurisdictional structure created by the BAFJA, the question arose:
Was [Vickie Lynn Marshall’s] counterclaim a matter on which the bankruptcy court
could—on the one hand—enter final judgment, as a core [proceeding], or—on the
other—only enter proposed findings and conclusions, subject to de novo review in the
district court, as a non-core [proceeding]? As it turned out, hundreds of millions of
dollars turned on that question.52
And this is why.
The bankruptcy court ruled against Pierce Marshall on his defamation claim, and in favor
of Vickie Lynn Marshall on her counterclaim.53 The court later awarded Vickie Lynn some $400
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million in compensatory damages and another $25 million in punitive damages.54 On appeal to
the district court, Pierce Marshall argued that Vickie Lynn’s counterclaim was not a “core
proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), and, therefore, that the bankruptcy court lacked the
necessary jurisdiction to hear and decide Vickie Lynn’s counterclaim.55 Although the district
court disagreed with Pierce, finding that Vickie Lynn’s counterclaim fell within the “literal
language” of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the court also recognized—citing Northern Pipeline—
that “it would be unconstitutional to hold that . . . all counterclaims are core” despite the literal
language of the Code.56 The district court thus reasoned that a “counterclaim should not be
characterized as core when it is only somewhat related to the claim against which it is asserted,
and when the unique characteristics and context of the counterclaim place it outside the normal
type of set-off or other counterclaims that customarily arise.”57 Applying this rationale, the
district court concluded that Vickie Lynn’s counterclaim was not core, and that the court was
required to treat the bankruptcy court’s judgment for Vickie Lynn as proposed rather than final.58
After an independent review of the record, the district court similarly found that Pierce had
tortuously interfered with Vickie Lynn’s expectation of a gift from J. Howard Marshall II and
awarded her roughly $100 million.59
But in the period between the bankruptcy court’s ruling in favor of Vickie Lynn and the
district court’s affirmance of that ruling, a probate court in Texas found in favor of Pierce on
essentially the same claim—that is, the court ruled that J. Howard Marshall II did not intend to
give Vicki Lynn a gift or bequest from his estate or the relevant trust, and that Vickie Lynn was
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accordingly not entitled to any distribution from the Estate of J. Howard Marshall II by virtue of
any agreement.60 This presented a problem for Vickie Lynn. As subsequently explained by
Craig Goldblatt, co-counsel to the Marshall estate in the Supreme Court:
[I]f the bankruptcy court’s ruling was a “judgment” [on a core matter], the Texas state
court should have given preclusive effect to the bankruptcy court’s prior judgment. [But]
if the matter was non-core, so that the bankruptcy court’s decision [was] better
understood as proposed findings [of fact] and conclusions [of law], the [federal] district
court should have given preclusive effect to the Texas state court’s prior judgment, and
Vickie [Lynn] would be entitled to recover nothing.61
Hundreds of millions of dollars thus turned on whether Vickie Lynn’s counterclaim was a “core”
or “non-core” proceeding.62 After an appeal to the Ninth Circuit,63 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve two issues: whether the bankruptcy court had statutory authority under 28
U.S.C. § 157(b) to issue a final judgment on Vickie Lynn’s counterclaim; and, if so, whether
conferring such authority on the bankruptcy court was constitutional.64
The Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining that a “counterclaim[] [filed] by the
estate against [a] person filing [a] claim[] against the estate” is a “core proceeding” under the
plain language of § 157(b)(2)(C).65 The bankruptcy court thus had express statutory authority to

60
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issue a final judgment on Vickie Lynn’s counterclaim.66 As to the second issue—whether
conferring such authority on the bankruptcy court was constitutional—the Court explained that
“[a]lthough we conclude that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter [a] final
judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does not.”67
In brief, a sharply divided Court held “that the bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional
authority to decide [Vickie Lynn’s] state law counterclaim to the extent that it was not resolved
in the process of ruling on [Pierce Marshall’s] proof of claim.”68 Given that the bankruptcy court
lacked the authority to enter a judgment on the counterclaim, “the Texas state court judgment in
favor of . . . Pierce Marshall was entitled to preclusive effect.”69 Consequently, the estate of J.
Howard Marshall III owed Vickie Lynn nothing.70
But “[o]ther than ending a protracted and high-profile legal dispute,”71 is there reason to
believe that Stern presents a serious threat to the current bankruptcy system as established by the
BAFJA?

Some academics think so.72

In fact, Stern’s reasoning has prompted numerous

challenges to the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue final orders on those matters that do not
directly stem from the bankruptcy process.73
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For example, in Parks v. Consumer Law Associates, LLC (In re Lewis),74 the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas held—after the defendants renewed their
motion to withdraw the reference and transfer the action to the District of Kansas in light of
Stern—that it did not have the authority to enter a final judgment on the trustee’s disgorgement
of fees claim or her claim for violation of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA).75
Although recognizing that the case differed from Stern in “many ways,” the bankruptcy court
ultimately concluded that because such “claims involve the adjudication of ‘private rights’ and
are not intrinsic to the bankruptcy process,” it would be improper for a non-Article III tribunal to
enter final judgment on such matters.76 Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to withdraw the
reference and transfer the action to the district court was granted.77
Similarly, in Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth),78 a Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid an
allegedly fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code and California law.79 The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the trustee’s fraudulent transfer claim on the basis that the bankruptcy
court lacked jurisdiction over the claim.80 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Montana granted the motion, reasoning that Stern requires fraudulent transfer claims to be
decided in federal district court.81 And citing Stern, the Ninth Circuit, in a recent decision,
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similarly agreed with an appellant that fraudulent conveyance claims must be decided by Article
III tribunals.82
But is Stern v. Marshall really a “jurisdictional game changer” with grave consequences,
or merely a “narrow ruling that fails as a practical matter to meaningfully change the extent of
[the] bankruptcy court[s’] power?”83 Commentators largely agree that the impact of Stern will
depend on how the lower courts—both bankruptcy and appellate—interpret the opinion.84 Thus,
attempting to predict Stern’s potential impact(s) on the American bankruptcy system requires an
examination of recent lower court opinions.

Indeed, only by examining recent opinions

construing Stern will we be able to understand and predict the likely impact(s) of Stern on
creditors, debtors, bankruptcy courts and practitioners.
III. The Implications of Stern v. Marshall
Since Stern v. Marshall, judges across the country have struggled to define the bounds of
bankruptcy court authority and jurisdiction.85 As the Honorable Jeffery R. Hughes lamented:
[Although] Stern is careful to limit its holding . . . those who labor in the [bankruptcy]
fields can[not] wait until the next fistfight between an expectant heir and his stepmom
finds its way to the Court. . . . Stern certainly reaffirms that only an Article III judge can
enter a judgment associated with the estate’s recovery of contract and tort claims
82
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Files, BANKR. BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011), http://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/jurisdiction/the-sternfiles/#axzz1pZjKiQ8s (explaining that “[a]s soon as the Stern opinion was released, the question on the minds of
bankruptcy professionals everywhere was how [the opinion] would affect the bankruptcy practice,” and concluding
that “[t]he answer . . . will be determined largely by how the lower courts interpret the . . . Court’s ruling.”).
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See Eric. J. Fromme & Caroline Djang, Stern v. Marshall Bankruptcy Case: Bombshell or Dud?, L.A. DAILY
J.,
Oct.
25,
2011,
available
at
http://www.rutan.com/files/Publication/60d7e6e6-1c94-4d36-a3f3eebfab2937d6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a691bc66-aa11-4ab7-9231f03f7ceb1f0f/Djang%20and%20Fromme%20two%20part%20%20DJ.pdf (explaining that “bankruptcy courts
around the country . . . have expressed frustration with the ‘cloud of uncertainty’ relating to the bankruptcy court’s
authority to enter final judgments.”); Madlyn G. Primoff & Seth J. Kleinman, Stern v. Marshall: What the United
States Supreme Court Has to Say About Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, KAYE SCHOLER LLP, 2 (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.kayescholer.com/news/publications/201109211/_res/id=sa_File1/NYLJStern_v_Marshall21Sept11.pdf.
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designed to augment the estate. . . . But Stern is silent as to how much further this
constitutional protection extends into the bankruptcy process.86
Consequently, until the U.S. Courts of Appeal begin to provide much-needed clarity on the limits
of the opinion, the impact of Stern will depend entirely on how the bankruptcy courts interpret
the decision.87

Although the bankruptcy courts have only just begun to wrestle with the

implications of Stern, certain trends are emerging.88
First, bankruptcy courts tend to interpret Stern narrowly, “reflect[ing] an obvious tension
between [the] courts’ natural desire to preserve their authority and their deference to
constitutional constraints.”89 Second, the general trend is to proceed cautiously, often requiring
additional briefing as to Stern’s implications before issuing a judgment, lest the court overstep its
constitutional authority.90 Finally, bankruptcy courts (and recently, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits)
generally agree that parties are able to consent to jurisdiction.91
1. Interpreting Stern Narrowly
Despite initial concerns regarding the potentially broad implications of Stern, most courts
have interpreted the opinion narrowly.92 After all, as the Honorable Cecelia Morris observed,
“Stern is replete with language emphasizing that the [opinion] should be limited to the unique
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Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Adam Lewis et al., Judicial Restraint in the Early Days Following Stern v. Marshall, BLOOMBERG LAW REP.,
Nov. 29, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/111129-Judicial-Restrain-in-the-EarlyDays-Following-Stern-v-Marshall.pdf.
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Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.; see Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 567–
70 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 404–07
(5th Cir. 2012) (analyzing the impact of Stern to determine whether federal magistrates retain the authority to enter
final judgments on state-law counterclaims when parties consent to trial and entry of judgment by a federal
magistrate judge, and concluding that they do). But see Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 2012)
(finding that parties cannot consent to final adjudication when the bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to
decide the matter), cert. denied, No 12-933, 2013 WL 317425 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2013).
92
Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 1.
87
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circumstances of that case.”93 Accordingly, most bankruptcy courts have held that Stern does
not limit their ability to enter final judgments on fraudulent transfer or conveyance claims;94
turnover proceedings;95 proceedings for relief from an automatic stay;96 proceedings for approval
of a settlement;97 and many other claims.98
While a minority of courts have interpreted Stern more broadly, holding that bankruptcy
courts lack the constitutional authority to enter final judgments on avoidance actions, fraudulent
transfer claims, and preference actions,99 these broad interpretations “appear[] to be the
exception rather than the rule.”100 And although “some litigants have argued that the mere
presence of state-law issues in a bankruptcy proceeding limits the bankruptcy court’s [authority]
to issue a final judgment, [most] courts have declined to apply such a broad principle.”101

93

In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 475 B.R. 9 (S.D.N.Y.
2012); see also In re Crescent Res., LLC , 457 B.R. 506, 510 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011) (stating that the Stern
opinion “should be applied narrowly” and, consequently, that “Stern does not apply to this case”) (emphasis added).
94
See, e.g., KHI Liquidation Trust v. Wisenbaker Builder Servs., Inc. (In re Kimball Hill, Inc.), 480 B.R. 894,
906–08 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012); Cifelli v. Blue Star Residential, LLC (In re Miles), 477 B.R. 266, 269–70 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2012); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Appalachian Fuels, LLC v. Energy Coal Res., Inc. (In re
Appalachian Fuels, LLC), 472 B.R. 731, 741 (E.D. Ky. 2012); Kelley v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 464 B.R. 854,
861–63 (D. Minn. 2011); Springel v. Prosser (In re Innovative Commc’n Corp.), Bankr. No. 07–30012, Adv. No.
08–3004, 2011 WL 3439291 (Bankr. D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011); see also Onkyo Eur. Elecs. GMBH v. Global
Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.), 694 F.3d 705, 722 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that bankruptcy
courts can enter final judgment on fraudulent transfer claims). But see Arkison, 702 F.3d at 570 (holding that
bankruptcy courts cannot decide fraudulent transfer claims); Rosenberg v. Harvey A. Bookstein, 479 B.R. 584, 587–
89 (D. Nev. 2012) (same).
95
See, e.g., Shaia v. Taylor (In re Connelly), 476 B.R. 223, 235 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012) (explaining that Stern
does not affect the ability of the court to enter judgment on a turnover proceeding); Badami v. Sears (In re AFY,
Inc.), 461 B.R. 541, 548 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012) (affirming bankruptcy court’s determination that it had jurisdiction
over the turnover proceeding).
96
See, e.g., In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. at 117.
97
See, e.g., In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Whatever Stern v.
Marshall may ultimately be held to mean, this Court is confident that, as a matter of law and practice, it most
certainly does not stand for the proposition that the bankruptcy court cannot approve the compromise and settlement
of a claim which is indisputably property of a debtor’s estate.”).
98
See Fromme & Djang, supra note 85, at 2 (explaining that bankruptcy courts have held that they retain the
authority to enter final judgments on equitable subordination claims; debtors’ counterclaims that must be resolved
by ruling on a creditor’s claim; trustees’ breach of fiduciary duty or common law fraud claims; complaints to
determine the nondischargeability of debt and objections thereto; and many others).
99
Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 2; see also Rosenberg, 479 B.R. at 587–89.
100
Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 1.
101
Id. at 2 (citing, for example, In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. at 115).
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Rather, the clear trend among bankruptcy courts is to interpret Stern narrowly by reasoning that
it applies only to counterclaims like Vickie Lynn’s that fall under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).102
2. Proceeding with Caution
Even if Stern ultimately proves limited in application, the decision has already
engendered a great deal of uncertainty among bankruptcy judges regarding their authority to
enter final judgments.103 Bankruptcy courts have thus tended to proceed cautiously by:
[R]equiring parties to submit additional briefing[s] addressing Stern’s implications; [or
by] issuing [alternative] judgment[s] that . . . comport[] with [the] different outcomes of
the Stern analysis; or [] out of an abundance of caution, submitting only proposed
findings of facts and conclusions of law to the district court rather than entering [a] final
judgment.104
Regardless of the approach, the bankruptcy courts’ message is clear: “bankruptcy judges are
likely to proceed cautiously when confronted with questions regarding their constitutional
authority to enter final judgments.”105

This paper will now briefly discuss each of these

approaches in turn.
a. Specific Briefing
Although Chief Justice Roberts asserted that the Stern decision “[did] not change all that
much,”106 the Honorable James M. Peck recently observed that a “cloud of uncertainty” currently
envelopes the bankruptcy courts and the bounds of the courts’ jurisdiction, thus compelling many
bankruptcy judges to request that the parties brief the court as to Stern’s impact before entering a
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See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 719 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“This Court agrees
with the Stern Court that the decision in Stern ‘does not change all that much.’” (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.
Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011))); In re Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. at 115 (limiting Stern to the “unique
circumstances of that case”); Brook v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Peacock), 455 B.R. 810, 812 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2011) (explaining that Stern is “limited to precisely those facts”).
103
Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 2.
104
Id.
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Michael Klein & Ronald R. Sussman, Stern v. Marshall: Ruling That Didn’t ‘Change All That Much’
Changes
Everything,
J.
CORP.
RENEWAL,
Oct.
23,
2011,
available
at
http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectID=13658.
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Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
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final judgment, lest the judge inadvertently overstep the constitutional limitations on the court’s
jurisdiction.107 For example, In re Boricich involved a plaintiff who asserted five counts against
a debtor in a related Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.108 The fifth count was asserted derivatively and
sought a determination that the debt was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(4) due to the debtor’s
fraud and defalcation in a fiduciary capacity.109 The Honorable Jack B. Schmetterer explained
that, prior to Stern, and under applicable Seventh Circuit precedent, bankruptcy judges had been
allowed to determine non-dischargeablity claims and enter a dollar judgment on those
findings.110 However, in light of Stern, Judge Schmetterer declined to enter a dollar judgment
until both parties submitted supplemental “briefs discussing Stern and demonstrating that [the
bankruptcy court retained the] Constitutional authority to enter . . . a money judgment.”111
Supplemental briefs similarly were requested in In re DBSI, Inc.,112 In re Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc.,113 and In re Bellingham Insurance Agency.114 Such requests illustrate
the tendency of some bankruptcy judges “to vet Stern issues methodically and carefully” before
entering a final judgment on the matter.115
b. Alternative Rulings
107

See infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
Dragisic v. Boricich (In re Boricich), Bankr. No. 08 B 15248, Adv. No. 08 A 00728, 2011 WL 2600692, at
*1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 29, 2011).
109
Id.
110
Id. at *9 (citing N.I.S. Corp. v. Hallahan (In re Hallahan), 936 F.2d 1496, 1508 (7th Cir. 1991)).
111
Id.
112
Federal Ins. Co. v. DBSI, Inc.(In re DBSI, Inc.), Bankr. No. 08–12687 (PJW), Adv. No. 09–52031(PJW),
2011 WL 3022177, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. July 22, 2011) (requesting that both parties submit “written submissions
on whether Stern v. Marshall permits [the bankruptcy judge] to issue” defendant’s partial summary judgment
motion).
113
Adv. Proc. No. 10-03266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://www.burbageweddell.c
om/2011/08/18/note-nysb-1-10-03266-93/ (explaining that “[i]n a telephonic chambers conference held on June 29,
2011, the Court asked counsel for Lehman Brothers . . . the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman
Brothers . . . and JPMorgan to submit papers addressing the effect of Stern on the claims asserted in the above
captioned adversary proceeding”).
114
Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 661 F.3d 476, 476 (9th Cir.
2011) (explaining that the bankruptcy judge requested that the parties submit supplemental briefs discussing whether
Stern v. Marshall “prohibit[ed] bankruptcy courts from entering . . . binding judgment on an action to avoid a
fraudulent conveyance”).
115
Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 2.
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Another trend among bankruptcy judges is to enter final judgments and propose rulings
“in the alternative,” in an effort to address the uncertainty engendered by the Stern opinion.116
For example, a number of courts have held:
[I]n the event that [the] district court later finds that the bankruptcy court lacked [the]
constitutional authority to render [a] final judgment [on the matter], the bankruptcy
court’s decision should constitute a report and recommendation to the district court in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).117
This precise approach was taken by the Honorable Judith Fitzgerald in Springel v. Prosser (In re
Innovative Communication Corp.).118

In Springel, the Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of

Innovative Communication Corporation sought to both avoid and recover prepetition fraudulent
conveyances and unauthorized post-petition transfers.119 The court found in favor of the Trustee
on the claims and, after determining that Stern did not limit the bankruptcy court’s ability to
enter a final judgment, issued an order for the Trustee.120 However, recognizing the uncertainty
engendered by Stern v. Marshall, the Honorable Judith Fitzgerald held—in the alternative—that:
Assuming, arguendo, that the District Court disagrees and reads [Stern] broadly to
conclude that . . . the opinion limits this court’s jurisdiction [over the Trustee’s claims] to
making a Report and Recommendation, this Memorandum Opinion . . . constitutes our
Report and Recommendation to the District Court.121
Similar approaches were taken in Tibble v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re Hudson)122 and In re
Heller Ehrman LLP.123

Consequently, even when bankruptcy judges believe that Stern is
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Id.
Id.
118
Springel v. Prosser (In re Innovative Commc’n Corp.), Bankr. No. 07–30012, Adv. No. 08–3004, 2011 WL
3439291, at *1 (Bankr. D.V.I. Aug. 5, 2011).
119
Id.
120
Id. at *51.
121
Id. at *3.
122
455 B.R. 648, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“The court will enter a final order. If this court’s order is
appealed, and the district court decides this court is not constitutionally authorized to issue a final order in this . . .
proceeding, this Opinion should be treated as a report and recommendation.”).
123
Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), Bankr. No. 08–32514DM, Adv.
No. 10–3203DM, 2011 WL 4542512, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011) (explaining that “any findings of fact I
make at trial should be treated as proposed if the district court concludes that I lacked authority actually to enter
those findings.”).
117
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inapplicable to the matters before them, judges’ recognition of the uncertainty engendered by the
opinion and the undesirability of being overruled has resulted in at least some judges issuing
alternative rulings as a means of “preserving their decisions.”124
c. “Over-Abundance of Caution”
Other bankruptcy judges have proceeded extremely cautiously, choosing to submit only
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law “even while acknowledging that Stern’s impact
on the case at issue is unclear.”125 This was the approach taken by the Honorable Brian K. Tester
in In re Medical Educational and Health Services, Inc.126 Debtor-plaintiff Medical Educational
and Health Services, Inc. asserted, inter alia, various state law claims against the defendants.127
After reviewing Stern in some detail, the Honorable Brian K. Tester concluded that it was
unclear whether the decision precluded him from issuing a judgment on the debtor-plaintiff’s
state law claims.128 Accordingly, the judge observed:
[Stern v. Marshall’s] applicability to the matters at hand . . . [is] non-conclusory. . . . The
saf[est] interpretation as to the limitations upon this court due to the effect of the Stern
case is that this Court may only submit proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law
regarding the state law claims against Defendant.129
Although some bankruptcy judges disapprove of such a cautious approach,130 other bankruptcy
judges adhere to it, calling the approach the “most prudent and expedient course of action,” and
deeming it an attempt “to insulate the ultimate judgment from collateral attack given the
124

Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 2.
Id.
126
Medical Educ. & Health Servs., Inc. v. Independent Mayaguez (In re Med. Educ. & Health Servs., Inc.), 459
B.R. 527 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011).
127
Id. at 534.
128
Id. at 549.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 324 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011) (“One alternative would be to play it safe and simply refer without reflection every future determination
I make to a district judge for his or her final review. However, I do not see how I can do so in good faith given
Authority Section 157(b)(3)’s direction that I must decide even in instances when not requested whether I have the
ability or not under that section to enter a final order. Moreover, I suspect that the Article III judges in my district
would not be pleased with the extra workload such an approach would impose upon them.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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presently-confused state of the law.”131 Consequently, regardless of the approach taken, the
trend is clear: bankruptcy judges are likely to proceed cautiously in the post-Stern era in
determining whether they retain the authority to enter final orders on the matters before them.132
Of course, the degree of caution will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction by Consent
Following Stern v. Marshall, practitioners initially were fearful that bankruptcy courts
would be incapable of entering final judgments on non-core matters—even where the parties
consented to jurisdiction.133 As the Honorable Robert E. Gerber bemoaned:
[I]t may now be, and it’s fair to assume that it will now be argued, that consent, no matter
how uncoerced and unequivocal, will never again be sufficient for bankruptcy judges . . .
to issue final judgments on non-core matters [post-Stern]. That huge uncertainty
presages litigation over that issue with the potential to tie up this case, and countless
others, in knots. . . invit[ing] litigants to consent, see how they like the outcome, and
then, if they lose, say their consents were invalid.134
However, as Lewis, Steinberg-Barrage, Novak, and Kushner explain, these initial concerns were
largely unfounded, and, to date, “bankruptcy jurisdiction by consent appears to remain alive and
well.”135 In fact, “[v]irtually every case discussing Stern that has addressed the issue of consent
has concluded that, with respect to non-core, ‘related to’ proceedings . . . a bankruptcy court may
issue [a] final judgment with the parties’ consent.”136
For example, Adams National Bank v. GB Herndon & Associates, Inc. (In re GB
Herndon & Associates, Inc.) involved co-defendants who breached a forbearance agreement with
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Richardson v. BDSM Corp. (In re Tevilo Indus., Inc.), Bankr. No. 09–07311, Adv. No. 11–80300, 2011 WL
4793343, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2011).
132
See Klein & Sussman, supra note 105.
133
Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 3.
134
In re BearingPoint, Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
135
Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 3.
136
Id. Lewis, Steinberg-Barrage, Novak, and Kushner explain that “related to” proceedings are “proceedings
that are not ‘core proceedings’ under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) but are ‘related to a case under’ the Bankruptcy Code.”
Id.
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a lender and, in answering the lender’s complaint, asserted various counterclaims.137 In order to
prevent the lender from foreclosing on and selling the collateral securing the note, the defendants
filed for bankruptcy, thereby triggering the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.138
After the various claims and counterclaims had been removed to the bankruptcy court, the court
dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims.139 Invoking Stern v. Marshall, the debtor-defendants
then filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment and to Alter or Amend Judgment, claiming that the
bankruptcy court lacked the constitutional authority to resolve their counterclaims.140 The court
denied the defendants’ motion, concluding that the defendants had “undisputedly waived” their
right to have their counterclaims adjudicated in an Article III court.141 The court explained:
[As in] Schor, it was [defendants’] choice to litigate in this court and it was only after the
court entered judgment in favor of [the plaintiff] on the claim that [defendants] raised a
challenge to this court’s authority. . . . If the [defendants] believed that the Bankruptcy
Court lacked the authority to decide [their] claim . . . then [the defendants] should have
said so—and said so promptly. [Defendants’] failure to do so constitutes a waiver of
[the] right to an Article III adjudication.142
The Honorable S. Martin Teel, Jr. thus concluded that bankruptcy courts may adjudicate noncore proceedings “without running afoul of Article III, when there has been consent by the
parties.”143 Numerous other bankruptcy courts have reached the same conclusion.144 The Sixth
and Ninth Circuits, however, have split on whether parties in bankruptcy court are able to
137

Adams Nat’l Bank v. GB Herndon and Assocs., Inc. (In re GB Herndon & Assocs., Inc.), 459 B.R. 148,
151–52 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011).
138
Id. at 152.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 153–54.
141
Id. at 157.
142
Id. at 157–58 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
143
Adams Nat’l Bank, 459 B.R. at 162.
144
See, e.g., In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[P]arties can still
consent—either expressly or impliedly—to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction after Stern.”); In re Olde Prairie Block
Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Nonetheless, even if that ground were not available under
Stern for entry of final judgment . . . a second ground exists: the parties consented to final judgment.”); Pro–Pac,
Inc. v. Chapes (In re Pro-Pac, Inc.), 456 B.R. 894, 902–03 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011) (stating that “Stern confirms that
the bankruptcy court has the authority to render final judgments even in non-core proceedings with the consent of
the parties.”). But see In re BearingPoint, Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (questioning whether
consent can effectively confer jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy courts).
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consent to final adjudication of non-core proceedings.145 But a recent decision by the Fifth
Circuit appears to tip the balance in favor of allowing final adjudication of non-core proceedings
in bankruptcy court if the parties consent to adjudication therein.146 Accordingly, given the
treatment of consent by most of the bankruptcy courts and a majority of the appellate courts that
have directly confronted the issue, jurisdiction by consent appears to be “alive and well” in the
post-Stern era.147
4. Summarizing the Impact of Stern v. Marshall
Commentators largely agree that the immediate impact of Stern v. Marshall will depend
on how lower courts interpret the opinion.148 Although the bankruptcy courts have just begun to
grapple with the implications of Stern, certain trends clearly are emerging: bankruptcy courts
tend to interpret Stern narrowly;149 proceed cautiously, often requesting that the parties submit
supplemental briefs before issuing orders;150 and agree that parties are able to consent to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the matter.151 It thus would appear that Stern may not be the
“jurisdictional game changer” it was once feared to be.152
Of course, the true meaning of Stern will depend on how the appellate courts interpret the
decision.153

But until then, how are bankruptcy judges—to borrow the language of the
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Compare Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 570
(9th Cir. 2012) (finding that litigants can consent to final adjudication of non-core proceedings in bankruptcy court),
with Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that parties cannot consent to final adjudication
in bankruptcy court when that court lacks constitutional authority to decide the matter).
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See Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 404–07 (5th Cir. 2012)
(analyzing the impact of Stern to determine whether federal magistrates retain authority to enter final judgments on
state-law counterclaims when the parties consent to trial and entry of judgment by a federal magistrate judge, and
concluding that they do).
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Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 3.
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Lewis et al., supra note 71, at 1.
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Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 1.
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See Primoff & Kleinman, supra note 85, at 5 (explaining that the true implications of Stern will remain
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Honorable Jeffery R. Hughes—to “recalibrate the core/non-core dichotomy so that [bankruptcy
judges] can again proceed with at least some assurance that [they] will not be making the same
constitutional blunder with respect to some other aspect of Authority Section 157(b)(2)”?154
Likewise, how are bankruptcy practitioners to proceed with confidence that a judgment on a
“non-core, related to” matter, entered in their favor, will be upheld on appeal? After all, the
Stern opinion “seemingly invite[s] litigants to consent, see how they like the outcome, and then,
if they lose, say their consents were invalid.”155
IV. The Multi-Step Inquiry
Recognizing the above shortcomings, this section offers a multi-step inquiry to aid
bankruptcy judges and practitioners in determining whether a non-core matter is capable of being
determined in a non-Article III tribunal:
Bankruptcy judges and practitioners should begin by making a two-part inquiry: First, is
the asserted claim “related to a case” arising under the Code? Second, have the parties consented
to adjudication in bankruptcy court?

If both questions are answered affirmatively, the

bankruptcy court likely has authority to enter final judgment on the matter, as virtually every
court that has addressed the issue of consent post-Stern has found that, “with respect to non-core,
‘related to’ proceedings,” bankruptcy courts can issue final judgment on the matter as long as the
parties have expressly or impliedly given their consent.156 Accordingly, when confronted with
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2011).
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In re BearingPoint, Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
See Lewis et al., supra note 88, at 3; see also Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham
Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 570 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[P]arties can still consent—either expressly or impliedly—to a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction
after Stern.”); In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Nonetheless, even
if that ground were not available under Stern for entry of final judgment . . . a second ground exists: the parties
consented to final judgment.”). But see Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
consent is ineffectual because the limitation is a structural principle imposed by Article III of the Constitution); In re
BearingPoint, Inc., 453 B.R. at 497 (speculating that “it may now be, and it’s fair to assume that it will now be
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non-core, “related to” proceedings, the most prudent course of conduct post-Stern is for
bankruptcy judges and practitioners to obtain the written consent of (as a judge) both parties or
(as a practitioner) the adverse party during the early stages of litigation.
Assuming the parties’ consent is unclear or has not been given, the bankruptcy judge or
practitioner should engage in another two-part inquiry: First, is the asserted claim founded on
state law?157 If so, can the claim nonetheless be resolved in the process of ruling on a core
proceeding?158 If the initial question is answered in the affirmative, the asserted claim is likely a
matter of private right that cannot be determined in a non-Article III tribunal absent the express
or implied consent of the parties.159 In determining whether a claim is a matter of private right,
the bankruptcy judge or practitioner should look to the “fundamental basis of recovery.”160 For
example:
[I]f a debtor in bankruptcy sues a counterparty . . . for improperly calculating the amount
due on a[n] . . . agreement terminated on account of bankruptcy, the [debtor]-plaintiff’s
right to recover . . . is founded on a contract, and it is therefore a matter of private right –
even if the dispute implicates a host of question about . . . ipso facto clause[s] and
whether the bankruptcy safe harbors do or do not apply.161
Because the debtor’s “fundamental basis of recovery” (at least in the above example) rests on a
state law contract claim, the simple fact that the claim presents a question—or perhaps
questions—of federal bankruptcy law will not convert the claim into a “matter of public right,”
any more than the presence of a state law issue in a proof of claim would convert that proof of
claim into a matter of private right.162
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However, even if the initial inquiry is answered in the affirmative, bankruptcy courts may
nonetheless have the authority to enter final judgment on the matter if the state law claim can be
resolved in the process of ruling on a core bankruptcy proceeding—which takes us to the second
inquiry to be made by the bankruptcy judge or practitioner. This qualifier is taken directly from
language in Stern v. Marshall. Therein, Chief Justice Roberts concluded:
The Bankruptcy Court below lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment
on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s
proof of claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals [dismissing the
action] is affirmed.163
Such language implies that even when a claim is a matter of state law (i.e., a matter of private
right), the bankruptcy court has the authority to enter final judgment on the matter if the state law
claim must be “resolved in the process of ruling on” a core bankruptcy proceeding—for
example, a creditor’s proof of claim.164
Thus, to summarize, in determining whether a matter is capable of being resolved in a
bankruptcy tribunal, the judge or practitioner should determine: (1) whether the proceeding is
“related to a case” arising under the Bankruptcy Code; and (2) whether the parties are voluntarily
in (i.e., have consented to) bankruptcy court. If both questions are answered in the affirmative,
the bankruptcy court likely has the authority to enter final judgment on the matter.165 If, for
whatever reason, consent is unclear or has not been given, the bankruptcy judge or practitioner
should ask: (1) whether the matter is founded on state law—that is, whether the “fundamental
163
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basis of recovery” is state law; and (2) if so, whether the matter must nonetheless be resolved in
the process of ruling on a related core proceeding. If both questions are answered in the
affirmative, the bankruptcy court likely has the authority to enter final judgment on the matter.
V. Conclusion
In the wake of Stern v. Marshall, there is nebulous uncertainty regarding its import.
Nevertheless, an assessment of bankruptcy court opinions suggests that courts generally are
interpreting Stern narrowly. This finding is unsurprising; it reflects “the bankruptcy courts’
natural desire to preserve their authority and their deference to constitutional constraints.”166
Of course, the true impact of Stern will largely depend on how the appellate courts
interpret the opinion.167 Although the appellate courts have begun to enter the fray, it is still too
early to ascertain any clear trends from these opinions. In fact, because only the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits have squarely confronted one of the questions left unresolved in Stern, and because
those courts are divided in their resolution of the issue—the significance of consent—the
appellate courts have only further muddied the import of Stern. Still, unless the appellate courts
interpret Stern in a manner markedly different from the bankruptcy courts, Stern likely will
remain a narrow ruling rather than a “jurisdictional game changer.”168 Until the uncertainty is
resolved, however, bankruptcy judges and practitioners should err on the side of caution by
employing the aforementioned analysis to determine whether bankruptcy courts have the
authority to enter final judgment on matters in the post-Stern era.
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